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Research  has  shown  a  discrepancy  between  estimated  and  actually  observed  accuracy  of  reminiscent
details  in eyewitness  accounts.  This  estimation-observation  gap  is  of  particular  relevance  with  regard
to  the  evaluation  of  eyewitnesses’  accounts  in the  legal  context.  To  date  it has  only  been  demonstrated
in  non-naturalistic  settings,  however.  In addition,  it is not  known  whether  this  gap  extends  to other
tasks  routinely  employed  in real-world  trials,  for instance  person-identiﬁcation  tasks.  In this  study,  law
students  witnessed  a  staged  event  and  were  asked  to  either  recall  the  event  and  perform  a  person  identi-
ﬁcation  task  or estimate  the  accuracy  of the  others’  performance.  Additionally,  external  estimations  were
obtained from  students  who  had  not  witnessed  the  event,  but  received  a written  summary  instead.  The
estimation-observation  gap was replicated  for reminiscent  details  under  naturalistic  encoding  condi-
tions.  This  gap  was  more  pronounced  when  compared  to  forgotten  details,  but not signiﬁcantly  so  when
compared  to consistent  details.  In contrast,  accuracy  on  the person-identiﬁcation  task  was  not  consis-
tently  underestimated.  The  results  are  discussed  in  light  of  their  implications  for  real-world  trials  and
future research.
© 2015  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  on  behalf  of  Colegio  Oﬁcial  de  Psicólogos  de  Madrid  This
is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license
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Habilidad  de  los  futuros  abogados  para  valorar  la  precisión  de  detalles
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La  investigación  ha  revelado  que  hay  diferencias  entre  la  precisión  estimada  y  la  observada  realmente
en  los detalles  evocados  en  los  relatos  de  testigos  oculares.  La  brecha  entre  estimación  y observación  es
especialmente  importante  en  la evaluación  de  los relatos  de  testigos  oculares  en  el  contexto  legal.  Sin
embargo,  hasta  la  fecha  solo  se ha  demostrado  en contextos  no  naturales.  Además,  no  se sabe  si  esta
brecha  es extensible  a  otras  tareas  habituales  en  pruebas  en  el  mundo  real,  como  las  de  identiﬁcación  de
personas.  En  este  estudio,  estudiantes  de  Derecho  presenciaron  un  montaje  y se les  pidió que  lo  recordaran
y llevaran  a cabo  una tarea  de  identiﬁcación  de  personas  o bien  que  estimaran  la precisión  de  la  actuación
de  los demás.  Además  se  obtuvieron  estimaciones  externas  de  los estudiantes  que  no  habían  presenciado
el  montaje,  recibiendo  un  resumen  escrito  en su lugar.  La  brecha  entre  estimación  y observación  se
replicó para  detalles  evocados  en  condiciones  de codiﬁcación  naturales.  La  brecha  era  más  pronunciada
cuando  se comparaban  con  detalles  olvidados,  aunque  no  signiﬁcativa  cuando  se comparaban  con detalles
congruentes.  Por  el  contrario,  no fue  infravalorada  de  un  modo  coherente  la  precisión  de  la  tarea  de
identiﬁcación  de personas.  Se  comentan  los  resultados  desde  el  punto  de  vista  de sus  implicaciones  para
los ensayos  en el  mundo  real y
©  2015  Publicado  por  Els
∗ Corresponding author. Knowledge Construction Lab. Knowledge Media Research Cen
E-mail address: a.oeberst@iwm-kmrc.de (A. Oeberst)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpal.2015.03.002
889-1861/© 2015 Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. on behalf of Colegio Oﬁcial de Ps
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). la  investigación  futura.
evier  España,  S.L.U.  en  nombre  de  Colegio  Oﬁcial  de  Psicólogos  de  Madrid
Este es un  artículo  Open  Access  bajo la  licencia  CC  BY-NC-ND
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
ter. Schleichstr. 6. D-72076 Tuebingen, Germany.
icólogos de Madrid This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
7 ology
b
r
n
l
b
t
a
d
i
l
c
s
w
1
o
t
a
f
w
t
a
i
m
a
s
o
t
m
i
a
p
e
t
E
r
(
r
i
&
o
M
B
2
t
l
2
c
h
&
e
w
n
(
B
i
r
o
w
p
t4 A. Oeberst / The European Journal of Psych
Consider the case of a witness who has been questioned twice
y the police and who reports some details only at the second inter-
ogation, one week later. Would you trust such novel recollections?
Research indicates that reminiscent details—details that have
ot been previously reported (Ballard, 1913) —are perceived to be
ess credible than details that have been consistently reported in
oth interrogations (Berman & Cutler, 1996). More importantly,
hey are perceived to be less credible than they actually are. In
 recent study, Oeberst (2012) asked students to encode two
ifferent types of stimuli (pictures in Experiment 1 and a ﬁlm
n Experiment 2). Directly after encoding as well as one week
ater, they were asked to remember as many details as they
ould. Crucially, another group was asked to estimate their fellow
tudents’ accuracy on this task. Accuracy of reminiscent items
as tremendously underestimated: while, after one week, only
9% of novel recollections were expected to be accurate, 84% were
bserved to be accurate (Oeberst, 2012; Exp. 2). Moreover, even
hough an estimation-observation gap was also found for forgotten
s well as for consistently recalled items, it was most pronounced
or reminiscent items. These ﬁndings are of particular relevance
hen it comes to eyewitness testimony and its evaluation in
he legal context. After all, a discrepancy between actual and
ssumed accuracy can result in momentous consequences for the
nvolved persons’ lives. But does this striking pattern extend to
ore complex and dynamic real-world events? The current study
imed at answering this question by having participants witness a
taged event. In addition, it was examined whether an estimation-
bservation gap would also be found in person-identiﬁcation
asks, which are often used in real-world trials.
Presumably based on informal observations of one’s own
emory for everyday experiences, individuals commonly hold the
mplicit assumption that memory for an event is best immediately
fter that event, and that it subsequently decreases with the
assage of time (Ballard, 1913; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Magnussen
t al., 2008; Oeberst, 2012)1. Although this is true with respect
o net memory performance over extended time intervals (e.g.,
bbinghaus, 1885), forgetting does not necessarily preclude
eminiscence of items, which were not previously recollected
e.g., Buschke, 1974) —it only implies that forgetting exceeds
eminiscence (Erdelyi, 2010). However, the pattern of forgetting
s much more consistent with one’s expectations (Fisher, Brewer,
 Mitchell, 2009; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). In contrast, the frequent
ccurrence of reminiscence as well as its reliability (Baugerud,
agnussen, & Melinder, 2014; Bluck, Levine, & Laulhere, 1999;
rock, Fisher, & Cutler, 1999; Dunning & Stern, 1992; Erdelyi,
010; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Oeberst, 2012) is rather unknown.
These considerations gain particular importance with regard
o the legal system. After all, decision-makers in this system are
aypersons when it comes to memory functioning (Fisher et al.,
009; Wise & Safer, 2003). Thus, empirical evidence stands in stark
ontrast to what these laypersons might expect. Expectations,
owever, guide the evaluation of eyewitness evidence (Leippe Romanzcyk, 1989). Moreover, some jury instructions even
xplicitly recommend consideration of the (in)consistency of a
itnesses’ statement made on various occasions (e.g., Florida
1 Note that there are also two  studies arriving at the opposite conclusion,
amely that the forgetting curve does not represent a common assumption among
potential) jurors, judges, and law enforcement (Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Tomas, &
radshaw, 2006; Wise & Safer, 2003). I believe, however, that this may  be due to
ts operationalization. Both studies assessed (dis)agreement to the statement “The
ate of memory loss for an event is greatest right after an event and then levels
ff over time” (Wise & Safer, 2003; p. 11), which represents a rather complicated
ording and might thus be difﬁcult to understand. Simple visualizations of memory
erformance over time as used by Oeberst (2012), in contrast, should be less prone
o  misunderstandings. Applied to Legal Context 7 (2015) 73–79
Supreme Court Standard Jury Instructions 3d, 2009). Reminiscence
falls under the umbrella of such inconsistencies since the term
‘inconsistencies’ is referred to in a rather general way (e.g., Sixth
Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, No. 107, 2005) thereby
conﬂating different types of inconsistencies (e.g., reminiscence,
forgetting, contradictions). Logical and empirical aspects argue
against such a conﬂation, however (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Brock
et al., 1999; Fisher et al., 2009; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). After all,
only contradictions involve at least one false statement2. Details, in
contrast, which were recollected only once, but not another time,
could very well be accurate. That is, neither details, which were
forgotten thereafter, nor recollections that were reported only at a
later date (i.e., reminiscence) are necessarily inaccurate. However,
whereas the pattern of forgetting seems in line, reminiscence
seems at odds with one’s expectations (Fisher et al., 2009; Gilbert
& Fisher, 2006). Furthermore, doubts in the reliability of reminis-
cent recollections may  be nourished by lawyers, who are trained
to provoke such inconsistencies (e.g., Prager, Moran, & Sanchez,
1996) in order to discredit vulnerable eyewitnesses (Ellison, 2001).
Despite the sizable gap between estimated and observed accu-
racy of reminiscent details found by Oeberst (2012) it remains
unclear whether the results generalize to naturalistic settings.
In that study, participants’ attention was explicitly drawn to
the to-be-remembered materials because of the research setting
(i.e., participants were explicitly asked to watch a video or view
pictures), which is usually not the case in real-world settings. More-
over, events in the real world differ from pictures and ﬁlms in
various ways. Beyond differences in scaling (screen-size vs. life-
size) and dimensionality (two- vs. three-dimensional, e.g., Schmitt
& Anderson, 2002), witnesses in real-world settings not only view
the event from their unique perspective, but are also involved to
some extent. All in all, encoding pictures or ﬁlms is not compara-
ble to real-world situations and hence, generalizability cannot be
taken for granted (e.g., Farin˜a, Arce, & Real, 1994; Ihlebæk, Løve,
Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2003). Despite this insight and previously
raised concerns regarding ecological validity (e.g., McCloskey &
Egeth, 1983; Yuille & Wells, 1991) hardly anything is known for
adult witnesses about the actual accuracy of reminiscent items
under natural encoding conditions since research on the accuracy
of reminiscence usually employed videos (e.g., Brock et al., 1999;
Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Scrivner & Safer, 1988; Turtle & Yuille, 1994)
and studies investigating memory of naturally encoded events (e.g.,
autobiographical memory) often lack the possibility to assess accu-
racy reliably (e.g., Campbell, Nadel, Duke, & Ryan, 2011; Nadel,
Campbell, & Ryan, 2007) or the possibility to identify genuine
reminiscences due to media coverage (Yuille & Cutshall, 1986).
However, should the estimation-observation gap be of any rele-
vance for real trials, it is necessary to show that it occurs in more
naturalistic settings as well. The main objective of the present study
is therefore to examine whether the large discrepancy between
expected and observed memory accuracy would replicate under
naturalistic conditions.
A second goal of the present study was to examine whether
the estimation-observation gap extends to identiﬁcation tasks.
To date, a majority of wrongful convictions may  be attributed to
errors in this process (Innocence Project, 2012; Scheck, Neufeld,
& Dwyer, 2000). This suggests the opposite of what has been
found for reminiscent items, namely an overestimation of what
eyewitnesses are actually capable of. Moreover, research con-
ducted under natural encoding conditions hints towards a rather
low actual performance (e.g., Behrman & Davey, 2001; Farin˜a
2 Note that there are some cases such as when continuous information (e.g., age)
is involved, in which two  different statements could both count as correct – if one
assumes a certain range of correct answers (e.g., 22-25 years).
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t al., 1994; Pozzulo, Crescini, & Panton, 2008; Read, Tollestrup,
ammersley, McFadzen, & Christensen, 1990; Tollestrup, Turtle,
 Yuille, 1994), which might preclude a gap between observations
nd estimations. A direct comparison, however, has not been con-
ucted yet. Because eyewitness-identiﬁcation tasks are routinely
mployed (Wells & Olson, 2002), it is important to know whether
erformance on these tasks is well estimated or rather over- or
nderestimated by authorities within the legal system. To this
nd, a photo-lineup procedure was included in the present study.
The present study thus set out to investigate whether the
stimation-observation gap would be obtained under real-world
onditions as well. To this end, law-students witnessed a staged
vent. Immediately after this event (t1) and again one week later
t2), half of them reported their recollections (observation group),
nd the other half estimated the amount and accuracy of their
ellow student’s accounts (online estimation group). Additionally,
stimations from participants who had not witnessed the event
hemselves (external estimation group) were collected. Following
eberst (2012), I expected actual accuracy of reminiscent items to
e signiﬁcantly underestimated by both estimation groups. More-
ver, I hypothesized that this difference between estimated and
bserved accuracy would be higher for reminiscent compared
o forgotten as well as consistently recollected items. In addi-
ion, a person-identiﬁcation task at t2 was included to explore
hether accuracy in this case is under-estimated as well—or
hether it is even overestimated, as suggested by previous indirect
vidence.
ethod
articipants
Altogether, 103 undergraduate law students (63 female) from
our different classes of a German university took part in both ses-
ions of this study. Mean age was 20.05 (SD = 1.56) (see Table 1).
bservation and estimation conditions did not differ with respect to
ge or sex, p’s > .1. All participants received candy for compensation.
able 1
ell Sample Sizes (N) per Condition.
Observation
group
Online
estimation group
External
estimation group
Target present 11 10 25
Target absent 16 18 23
Total sample 27 28 48
esign
This study comprised three independent variables. First, par-
icipants were assigned to one of three groups. One group had to
rovide their own recollections of the event (observation group)
hereas the other two groups had to provide estimations of their
eers’ memory performance. Two forms of estimation groups
xisted: one group provided estimations after having witnessed the
ame event and at the same time as the observation group (online
stimation group) and another group provided estimations only
n the basis of a short description of the event (external estima-
ion group). The second independent variable was point in time
nd it varied within participants but only for the observation and
nline estimation groups. Speciﬁcally, their recollections and esti-
ations were assessed once immediately after the staged event (t1)
s well as one week later (t2). Third, presence of the target in the
hoto lineup of the identiﬁcation task varied quasi-experimentally
etween participants in all groups. Applied to Legal Context 7 (2015) 73–79 75
Materials
Observation and online-estimation group.  The to-be-remembered
stimuli consisted of a staged event, which was witnessed at the very
beginning of two  introductory classes for law students (Course 1, 2).
The incident involved a young man  who  entered the room, walked
to the projector in the front, turned it on (light was projected on one
wall), turned it off again, unplugged it, coiled the cord and pushed
the projector towards the door. In Course 2, the man  actually left the
room and took the projector with him. In Course 1, the room was too
crowded so that he had to abandon the projector after appearing
to try to take it with him before he left. His attempt was obvious,
however, as indicated by the witnesses’ accounts. The event lasted
0:55 min  and 0:50 min  in Course 1 and 2, respectively. In order to
enable accuracy analyses, the staged event was covertly videotaped
by a confederate (a law student who  recorded the incident with a
small camera hidden in his folder).
External-estimation group. To ensure external validity, there
was an external-estimation group. In this group, participants of
two different introductory classes for law students (Course 3, 4)
received a short description of the staged event, which was based
on the recollections obtained from the observation group. After all,
this is the kind of information decision-makers in the legal context
are provided with. To this end, I determined the average amount
of details (n = 8) recollected by the observation group participants
and then chose the eight most frequently reported details. The
passage read: “A man entered the room, walked to the projector,
tampered with it, unplugged it, coiled the cord and pushed the
projector out of the room. The man  was described as relatively
tall (180-195 cm), in his twenties with dark blond hair. He was
wearing dark glasses, a jeans, and a sweater.”
Procedure
Observation and online-estimation group. The event was staged
shortly before the tutorial was  supposed to start. Most of the
students were already present whilst the lecturer was not. Imme-
diately after the “thief” had left the room, the lecturer and the
experimenter entered the room and told the students that the inci-
dent was  part of an eyewitness study. They were brieﬂy informed
that the study was  about what witnesses actually recollect and in
what people believe about eyewitnesses’ recollections and that the
study therefore consisted of two  tasks that differed between par-
ticipants. The experimenter then distributed the instructions and
answer-sheets for the two groups (observation vs. estimation) in
an alternating order, rendering assignment to condition pseudo-
random.
Participants in the observation group were asked to recall the
incident and describe the person as accurately as possible. Par-
ticipants in the online-estimation group estimated the average
accuracy of their fellow students’ memory reports (“What do you
think, how many of the details your peer students remember are
accurate”, 0% = all details are inaccurate to 100% all details are
accurate). Finally, all participants indicated their sex and age and
generated a code in order to be able to match their data between
both sessions. Participants were neither informed of this purpose
nor of the second session, however. Rather, the experimenter led
them to believe that the study consisted of one session only by
thanking them and distributing candy for compensation.
One week later, the experimenter returned and brieﬂy informed
the students that the study actually consisted of two sessions. The
task in each condition was identical to t1, with estimations refer-
ring to memory performance at t2. Additionally, participants were
asked to estimate accuracy for the following item types: details
recollected both times (consistent items), details reported only
in the ﬁrst session (forgotten items), and details recalled only in
76 A. Oeberst / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 7 (2015) 73–79
Table  2
Estimated and Observed Accuracy of the Different Item Types (Mean Percentage of Correct Items, Standard Deviations, Medians, and Interquartile Range).
Reminiscent Forgotten Consistent
M
(SD)
Median
(IQR)
M
(SD)
Median
(IQR)
M
(SD)
Median
(IQR)
Observation a 70.65
(39.88)
100.00
(55.00)
79.13
(30.00)
100.00
(45.83)
92.17
(6.52)
90.00
(13.33)
Online estimation 21.79
(14.80)
20.00
(18.75)
51.96
(22.66)
50.00
(30.00)
53.39
(25.50)
60.00
(45.00)
External estimation 25.88
(17.93)
20.00
(26.00)
57.23
(21.60)
60.00
(23.75)
56.00
(22.03)
60.00
(35.00)
O-E-Gap 46.28 23.84 37.15
Note. For calculation of the observation-estimation gap (i.e., the difference between observed and estimated accuracy), estimations were collapsed across both estimation
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Reminiscence was  operationalized as the number of details thatroups.  Means reported in the paper may  slightly deviate in the observation group d
a Percentage of confabulations for each item type can be inferred from the differ
onsistently reported details were inaccurate.
he second session (reminiscent items). In order to avoid mis-
nderstandings, each item type was described explicitly before
rompting a response (e.g., for the reminiscent items: “Consider
he case that a detail was reported today, in the second question-
ng, but not last week, in the ﬁrst questioning. What do you think
s the percentage of such details being accurate?”).
Subsequently, participants engaged in an identiﬁcation task. As
ecommended (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Wells, Memon, & Penrod,
006; Wells et al., 1998), the speciﬁc number of photos to be viewed
9) was not revealed and it was emphasized that the target person
ight or might not be among them. Following a sequential lineup
rocedure, participants in the observation condition were asked to
ecide for each photo, whether it depicted the target person or not
dichotomously) and to indicate their conﬁdence. Participants in
he estimation condition were asked to estimate the percentage of
orrect identiﬁcations after they had watched the whole series of
ictures if they thought that the target had been present as well as
he percentage of mistaken identiﬁcations.
Distractor selection was based on the witnesses’ verbal descrip-
ion of the target person and all photos were taken under similar
onditions (i.e., frontal; white plain background, neutral facial
xpression; cf. Wells et al., 2006; Wells et al., 1998). None of them
as afﬁliated with the law school where testing occurred. The dis-
ractor who resembled the target person most, as determined by
 pretest, was substituted for the target in the target absent con-
ition (Course 1). In Course 2, in contrast, the target was present.
n order to minimize experimenter effects (Wells et al., 1998; see
lso Greathouse & Kovera, 2009), the order of pictures had been
rranged by another person and the experimenter did not see the
resentation. Finally, the experimenter thanked all participants and
ssured them that there would be no further sessions. Again, they
eceived candy for compensation.
External estimation group. Participants in this group received a
rief description of the incident (see above) and were then asked
o estimate average accuracy of the recollections at t1 and t2 (mea-
urement was in principle identical to the online estimation group
nly without the temporal references). They were then informed
f the fact that the witnesses had recollected details either at both
ates, or only at t1 and t2 respectively and were asked to estimate
he percentage of correct details for these different item types.
inally, they read about the identiﬁcation task employed (including
nstructions) and were presented with the photos participants had
een. Participants in Course 3 received the target-present condition
nd were informed that the target was among them3. They were
3 The rationale for this procedure was that decision makers in the legal con-
ext as well would know whether the suspect had been among the persons in theissing values (of reminiscent or forgotten details) in within-subjects comparisons.
o 100%. That is, 29.35% of the reminiscent, 21.87% of the forgotten and 7.83% of the
then asked to indicate the percentage of students who had picked
one of the persons, and among these the rate of correct identiﬁ-
cations. Participants in Course 4 were informed of the target being
absent and only indicated the percentage of students who had
picked one of the persons (i.e., had committed a misidentiﬁcation).
Data Analysis
Recollections were split into single information units (e.g., “The
man  coiled up the cord” was  separated into “man”, “coil up”,
“cord”). Recollections from t2 were classiﬁed as either consistent
(details recollected at t1 and t2: cord / cord), forgotten (details
reported only at t1 but not at t2: cord / no description of cord),
or reminiscent (details recalled only at t2: no description of cord /
cord). Changes that did not affect the content (e.g., synonyms) were
treated as consistent information. Contradictions occurred only in
5 instances, therefore not allowing for reliable statistical analyses.
For this reason this item-type was  excluded. Note, however, that the
pattern of results was identical when a more conservative test was
applied—when contradictions were treated as two different units of
information such that the ﬁrst resembling a forgotten item and the
second falling into the category of a reminiscent item (see Oeberst,
2012). Unveriﬁable statements such as suspicions about intentions
of actors were not included. All units of information were scored for
accuracy.
Results
The analyses reported below were also run with course as
another between subjects factor. However, this factor yielded no
main effects or interactions, p’s > .18. For the sake of brevity and
clarity, this factor was omitted. Since the distribution of accu-
racy of reminiscent details was extremely left-skewed leading to
high standard deviations, Table 2 also displays medians and non-
parametrical tests assured statistical validity.
Planned Analyseshad been mentioned at t2 but not at t1. Reminiscence occurred fre-
quently (M = 2.42, SD = 1.84, range: 0-7) and was  documented
identiﬁcation task. Hence, it is not a question of whether the suspect was the actual
culprit, but rather, whether the accused person in court had been in the line-up (and
whether he had been identiﬁed, or not).
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identiﬁcations in contrast was  overestimated by both, the online,
t(17) = 2.74, p = .01, as well as the external estimation group, t(24)
T
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or the overwhelming majority of participants (22 out of
7).
First, the hypothesis that accuracy of reminiscent items is
enerally underestimated was tested. An ANOVA with group
observation, online estimation, external estimation) as between-
ubjects factor on (actual and estimated) accuracy of reminiscent
tems indeed yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of group, F(2,
4) = 31.61, p < .001, p2 = .40. Post-hoc comparisons (Bonfer-
oni corrected ps) revealed that the observation group differed
igniﬁcantly from both estimation groups, p’s < .001, whereas
he estimation groups did not differ from one another, p =
. As can be seen in Table 2, actual accuracy of reminiscent
tems was signiﬁcantly higher than had been expected by either
stimation group. Thus, the estimation-observation gap was
eplicated for reminiscent items under naturalistic encoding
onditions.
In order to test whether this gap is particularly pronounced for
eminiscent items, a mixed ANOVA with item type (reminiscent,
orgotten, consistent) as within-subjects factor, and group (obser-
ation, online estimation, external estimation) as between subjects
actor was run. It revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of group, F(2,
1) = 36.09, p < .001, p2 = .44, and a signiﬁcant main effect of
tem type, F(2, 182) = 49.71, p < .001, p2 = .35. These main effects
ere qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction, however, F(4, 182) =
.37, p = .01, p2 = .07. To elucidate this interaction, two  separate
NOVAs comparing reminiscent items to forgotten and consistent
tems, respectively, were conducted. The mixed ANOVA with item
ype (reminiscent, forgotten) as within-subjects factor, and group
observation, online estimation, external estimation) as between-
ubjects factor again revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of item type,
(1, 92) = 57.04, p < .001, p2 = .38, a signiﬁcant main effect of
roup, F(2, 94) = 27.46, p < .001, p2 = .37, as well as a signiﬁcant
nteraction of both factors, F(2, 92) = 6.29, p < .01, p2 = .12. As
an be seen in Table 2, the estimation-observation gap was  larger
or reminiscent (46.28) than for forgotten (23.84) items. Moreover,
stimation conditions, again, did not differ from one another, p =
92, whereas both differed signiﬁcantly from the observation group,
’s < .001 (Bonferroni corrected ps). Hence, accuracy of reminiscent
tems was underestimated to a larger extent than accuracy of for-
otten items. The pattern of results was different, however, when
omparing reminiscent and consistent items. There was only a
igniﬁcant main effect of item type, F(1, 93) = 79.96, p < .001, p2 =
46, as well as a signiﬁcant main effect of group, F(2, 93) = 51.38, p <
001, p2 = .53, but no signiﬁcant interaction, F(2, 93) = 0.59, p = .56.
lthough the results descriptively match the expectation that the
stimation-observation gap is larger for reminiscent items (46.28)
han for consistently recollected items (37.15), their difference was
ot signiﬁcant in the ANOVA conducted. Noticeably, in this case the
onparametric analysis yielded a much lower p-value, 2(2) = 3.92,
 = .14.
Taken together, there was a substantial observation-estimation
ap regarding accuracy. Actual recollections were much more accu-
ate than had been expected. The discrepancy was pronounced for
eminiscent items, though only in comparison with forgotten items
ut not with consistently recalled items.
able 4
ercentage of Witnesses Observed or Estimated to Provide Correct or Incorrect Identiﬁca
Observat
Target present Correct identiﬁcations 31.30 
False  identiﬁcations 31.30 
Target absent False identiﬁcations 45.50 
ote. Percentages do not sum up to 100% due to the fact that it was possible not to choos Applied to Legal Context 7 (2015) 73–79 77
Additional Analyses
Accuracy of the various item types. In order to test for differences
with regard to the accuracy of consistently recollected, forgotten,
and reminiscent items, an ANOVA was conducted in the observa-
tion group only with item type (consistent, forgotten, reminiscent)
as within-subjects factor on accuracy. It yielded a marginally signi-
ﬁcant main effect of item type, F(2, 36) = 3.22, p = .06, p2 = .15. The
corresponding non-parametric analysis was  far from signiﬁcance,
2(2) = 0.28, p = .87, however. Pairwise comparisons revealed that
reminiscent items proved to be signiﬁcantly less accurate than con-
sistent items, t(20) = 2.74, p = .01, d = 0.84, Z = 2.22, p = .03, but
comparably accurate as forgotten items, t(18) = 0.69, p = .50, d =
0.84, Z = 0.65, p = .52. Comparing consistent and forgotten items
yielded a signiﬁcant difference in a paired t-test, t(23) = 2.12, p <
.05, d = 0.59, but only a trend in the Wilcoxon-Test, Z = 1.61, p =
.11.
Overall memory performance. Overall accuracy of the eyewit-
ness accounts was  analyzed in a 2 (point in time: t1, t2) x 3
(group: observation, online estimation, external estimation) mixed
ANOVA. The analysis yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of group,
F(2, 99) = 95.20, p < .001, p2 = .66, a signiﬁcant main effect
of point in time, F(1, 99) = 146.38, p < .001, p2 = .60, as well
as a signiﬁcant interaction of both factors, F(2, 99) = 36.08, p
< .001, p2 = .42. As can be seen in Table 3, actual accuracy
was signiﬁcantly higher than expected by both estimation condi-
tions, t’s > 7, p’s < .001. Moreover, participants remained accurate
over one week, p > .42. Estimated accuracy, however, signiﬁcantly
decreased over time in both estimation groups t’s > 7, p’s < .001.
Thus, participants expected accuracy (not amount recalled!) to
signiﬁcantly decrease from t1 to t2. In reality, however, it did
not.
Table 3
Estimated and Observed Mean Overall Accuracy (SD) for both Points in Time
t1 t2
Observation group 88.60 (9.24) 87.37 (10.80)
Online estimation group 56.61 (13.30) 32.59 (16.41)
External estimation group 61.38 (16.48) 38.10 (16.68)
Identiﬁcation Task
Target present condition. One-sample t-tests indicated that the
observed rate of correct identiﬁcations did not differ from the esti-
mations provided by the external estimation group (see Table 4),
t(24) = 1.06, p = .30, but was by trend overestimated by the online
estimation group, t(9) = 1.91, p = .09. Estimation groups did not dif-
fer from one another, t(33) = 0.16, p = .88. The percentage of false= 2.64, p = .01, which, again, did not differ from one another, t(41)
= 0.70, p = .49.
tions.
ion Online estimation External estimation
44.00 (21.06) 35.32 (18.92)
47.78 (25.57) 42.72 (21.64)
53.00 (17.03) 52.39 (28.48)
e a person from the lineup.
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Target absent condition. The rate of false identiﬁcations expected
y the online estimation group as well as the external estimation
ondition did not signiﬁcantly exceed the actual percentage of eye-
itnesses who mistakenly identiﬁed an innocent person, t(9) =
.39, p = .19 and t(22) = 1.16, p = .26, respectively.
iscussion
The primary aim of this study was to explore whether the
stimation-observation gap extends to natural encoding condi-
ions. By using a staged event, the estimation-observation gap
as replicated. Actual memory performance was underestimated
y future attorneys, lawyers, and judges, and the extent of the
nderestimation was sizeable. Moreover, this pattern was signiﬁ-
antly more pronounced for reminiscent details than for forgotten
tems, which further documents the counterintuitive nature of
eminiscence (Fisher et al., 2009; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). The
stimation-observation gap was also descriptively higher for
eminiscence when compared to consistently recollected items;
his difference did not reach statistical signiﬁcance, however.
At ﬁrst glance, this is inconsistent with Oeberst (2012) who
ound signiﬁcant differences to both kinds of items in a study
nvolving an overall smaller N. A closer inspection of the data points
o smaller effect sizes in this study (p2 = .01; Oeberst, 2012: p2 =
09), which suggests that the study might have lacked the power to
etect the effect. However, future research taking the power issue
nto account is needed to reliably answer this question.
Another slight difference to previous ﬁndings under non-
aturalistic encoding conditions (Oeberst, 2012) regards the
ccuracy of reminiscent items. On average, they were less accu-
ate (71%; Oeberst, 2012: 84%). Could this be due to the different
ncoding conditions administered in both studies? On the one
and, the mean might not represent the data ideally because the
istribution was extremely left skewed (the median was 100%). On
he other hand, other authors who had used videotapes instead
f staged events reported comparable average rates to the ones
ound in the current study (e.g., Brock et al., 1999; Turtle & Yuille,
994). However, there is no study directly comparing videos to
ctually witnessed events that analyzed reminiscence (see Roebers,
elhaar, & Schneider, 2004; Thierry & Spence, 2004 for comparisons
egarding overall memory performance). Thus, further research is
eeded.
The second objective of this study was to explore the
eneralizability of the ﬁndings to eyewitness identiﬁcation tasks. In
his case, the pattern of results was less straightforward. Although
bservations met  expectations in some instances, deviations
ccurred in both directions—once overestimating the frequency of
rongful identiﬁcations and another time the frequency of correct
dentiﬁcations (or in other words: underestimating the percent-
ge of witnesses, who refrained from an identiﬁcation). Despite the
artly small sample sizes, it is noteworthy that it was not so much
hat estimations differ from the estimations regarding the accu-
acy of overall recollections. Rather, actual memory performance
as much worse than in the case of free recollections. Essentially,
he identiﬁcation task tests speciﬁc recognition memory, and pre-
ious research indicates some crucial differences. The presentation
f other (but highly similar) items at the time of test may  increase
ncertainty among witnesses (e.g., Robinson & Johnson, 1996) and
ltimately impair performance (e.g., Tulving & Thomson, 1971). It
emains unclear, however, whether estimators are aware of these
ifferences and could adjust their estimations accordingly. After
ll, estimations of others’ performance have never been assessed
n this paradigm before. Future research will need to clarify this.
Moreover, the potential inﬂuence of other relevant aspects that
ay  come along with real-world settings posits relevant questions Applied to Legal Context 7 (2015) 73–79
for future studies. On the one hand, this includes aspects of the
encoding (e.g., direct involvement, trauma, representative forensic
witness sample; Ihlebæk et al., 2003). On the other hand, however,
it concerns the numerous other aspects that characterize the legal
system and decision-making therein (Konecˇni & Ebbesen, 1992).
It has been questioned, for instance, whether elicitation of the
recollections in the lab (with mock witnesses) actually provides
participants with the identical task that real witnesses face (Farin˜a
et al., 1994). This argument might apply to various other aspects
and thus, it has been convincingly argued that evidence from
simulations may  have “face validity” but actually lacks a consid-
eration of the relevant factors that are present (Konecˇni & Ebbesen,
1992). Strictly spoken, evidence may  thus only be generalized to
real world settings if all factors operating in the legal system have
been taken into account (as is the case in ﬁeld studies). With regard
to the present phenomenon, for instance, it remains still an open
question of whether such inconsistencies have an effect upon the
perceived credibility of a witness in a real trial, let alone on the
verdicts (see also Konecˇni & Ebbesen, 1984).
The aim of the present study may  thus be understood as the
ﬁrst step of a gradual approximation of real world circumstances:
it was  tested whether the observation-estimation gap, that was
previously only demonstrated under artiﬁcial encoding condi-
tion, replicates under naturalistic encoding conditions. The present
ﬁndings indeed showed that eyewitness performance was  still
underestimated by future actors of the legal system and this was
particularly true for reminiscent items, which still seem to repre-
sent a stronger violation of laypersons’ intuition. There is still a long
way to go, however, to ensure general ecological validity.
Nevertheless, this leads us back to the fundamental concern
of this paper that inspired this research: the actors in the legal
system, who evaluate, question, defend, and judge the recollec-
tions of others almost every day, do so without any expertise
regarding the issue at hand. This notion has been pointed out and
empirically supported before (e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Tomas,
& Bradshaw, 2006; Magnussen et al., 2008) and 75% of the judges
surveyed by Wise and Safer (2003) expressed a need for more
training on eyewitness testimony. Lacking professional knowledge
about human memory, however, likely compels decision makers
to rely on their intuition instead (except for those cases, in which
expert testimony is sought). This paper is not the ﬁrst to suggest
that such intuitions (or expectations) may  be systematically
wrong. The literature on wrongful convictions speaks to the same
argument, although it is suggestive of deviations in the opposite
direction—an overestimation of witnesses’ capabilities (e.g., Huff,
1996; Levi, 1998). This makes clear that there is a ﬁne line and I do
not intend to advocate a more positive evaluation of eyewitness
memory in general when pointing to the underestimation of actual
eyewitness accounts. Rather, more research is needed with regard
to discrepancies between scientiﬁcally approved knowledge about
(eyewitness) memory on the one hand and the beliefs and expec-
tations about memory that are held by decision makers within the
legal system on the other. And crucially, it needs ecologically valid
research about this (Konecˇni & Ebbesen, 1992) as well as potential
countermeasures (e.g., Wise, Dauphinais, & Safer, 2007).
Conclusion
Because expectations guide the evaluation of eyewitnesses’
accounts in decision-makers within the legal system, it is very
important to learn more about these expectations. The present
study suggests that these expectations might be wrong in case
of reminiscent details. At the same time, differences were smaller
when it came to an identiﬁcation task. Further research is needed
in order to shed more light on this important issue.
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